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PROPERTY-CoURT OF EQUITY HAS THE POWER TO ORDER A
SALE FOR REINVESTMENT EVEN THOUGH No MEMBER OF THE
CLASS HAVING A CONTINGENT FUTURE INTEREST IS YET IN EXIST-
ENCE. Ball v. Curtis, 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571 (1982).
Sheila Ball Curtis, Orbin Joe Ball and Mary Ann Ball Franklin
each received separate tracts of land under the will of their father,
Orbin Ball, who died in 1968. The will granted the property to each
for life, with a remainder to his or her bodily heirs.'
Sheila Ball Curtis and her husband brought suit in the Wood-
ruff County Chancery Court seeking a sale of the land and reinvest-
ment of the proceeds. Orbin Joe Ball, Mary Ann Ball Franklin and
the two minor children of Mrs. Franklin were named as defendants
to the suit. Sheila and her husband presented evidence indicating
that the property was not productive and that they had negotiated a
favorable price for the sale of the land.2 Sheila acknowledged that it
was possible for her to have bodily heirs in the future and that the
proceeds of a sale for reinvestment would be placed in a trust to
protect the interests of any potential contingent remaindermen.3
The Woodruff County Chancery Court approved the sale. On
appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court and
held that a court of equity may order a sale for reinvestment even
though no persons having a contingent interest in the property are in
esse.4 In addition, the court held that the life tenant, Sheila, was a
proper representative of her unborn descendants since no other
members of the class of contingent remaindermen were in existence.
Ball v. Curtis, 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571 (1982).
Ball v. Curtis dealt with two distinct issues. The first was
whether a court of equity has the power to order a sale for reinvest-
ment of property in which unborn contingent remaindermen have
an interest. The second issue decided by the court was whether the
life tenant is a proper representative of her bodily heirs not in exist-
i. Abstract and Brief of Appellants at 2, Ball v. Curtis, 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571
(1982). The will reads in pertinent part: "I then give and devise this real estate as follows:
... (b) to Sheila Paulette Ball [now Sheila Ball Curtis], for life only, with the remainder at
her death to the heirs of her body begotten, per stirpes." [The will made similar provisions
for Orbin Joe Ball and Mary Ann Ball Franklin.]
2. Abstract, supra note 1, at 4-5.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Ze., "in existence."
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ence who have a contingent interest in the property. These two is-
sues are sometimes confused,5 but at least one leading case and one
prominent treatise author have noted the distinction between the
two issues. 6
The Power of a Court of Equity to Order the Sale of Land
Encumbered by Future Interests
The doctrine that a court of equity may order the sale of land in
which there are future interests is a development of American law.7
Courts previously had held that a court of equity could authorize
the sale of property in which infants had a present interest,8 but the
first major case to recognize that a court of equity could order the
sale of land affected by future interests was Bofil v. Fisher9 in 1850.
Significantly, the Bofil court also recognized that the failure to allow
a sale of property encumbered with future interests would render
such interests "an intolerable evil to a growing and prosperous com-
munity."' 0 This same rationale still applies today. I
Other early cases which recognized the judicial power to sell
lands affected by contingent future interests also emphasized the
hardship suffered by the life tenant when the land was unproduc-
tive.' 2 Gavin v. Curtin, 3 an early Illinois case, specifically addressed
this problem and deserves mention as an illustration of the manner
in which courts of equity concluded that a sale of land encumbered
by future interests was proper. Curtin was the owner of a life estate
in certain property with a contingent remainder in fee to her chil-
dren. She had no issue and brought an action to have a trustee ap-
pointed to sell the property and reinvest the proceeds. She
maintained that the property produced little income and that it
might be lost due to taxes. The court reasoned that the life tenant
5. See L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1945 (2d ed. 1956).
6. Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523, (1898); L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, supra
note 5, at § 1945.
7. Young v. Rice, 280 Ala. 581, 196 So. 2d 698 (1967) (citing 51 AM. JUR. 2d Life
Tenants and Remaindermen § 82 (1970)); L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, supra note 5, at § 1941.
8. See Ex parte Jewett, 16 Ala. 409 (1849); Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 884
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); In re Salisbury, 3 Johns. Ch. 347, 1 N.Y. Ch. Rep. 643 (1818).
9. 3 Rich. Eq. 1, 55 Am. Dec. 627 (S.C. 1850). See L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, supra note
5, at § 1943.
10. 3 Rich. Eq. at -, 55 Am. Dec. at 631.
11. See, e.g., Wright, Medieval Law in the Age of Space: Some "'Rules of Property" in
Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REV. 248, 276 (1968).
12. Reed v. Alabama & G. Iron Co., 107 F. 586 (C.C. N.D. Ga. 1901); Gavin v. Curtin,
171 I11. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898).
13. 171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523.
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was entitled to enjoy her present life estate and that any children
who might be born later were entitled to enjoy the remainder in fee.
The Illinois court then characterized the right to enjoy these estates
as legal rights which could not be protected if the court did not have
the power to render the necessary relief. Observing that a court of
equity will usually assume jurisdiction to protect a legal right when
there is no remedy at law, the court concluded that it had the power
to order the sale of the property.'4 The decisive factors in Gavin
appeared to be the unproductivity of the land coupled with the dep-
rivation of the rights of those with vested interests to enjoy the use
of the property. The unproductivity of the land has continued to be
a factor in these cases.' 5
In 1936 the American Law Institute recognized the doctrine of
judicial sale for reinvestment of land in which persons not in esse
have an interest.' 6 Many courts had already recognized the doc-
trine,' 7 and it has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases.' 8 Some
states have also enacted statutes which permit the sale of land en-
cumbered with future interests in certain limited situations.' 9 For
example, the Missouri statute20 seems to concur with Gavin v. Cur-
tin2' by providing that a court of equity may order the sale of land
in which the petitioner has a life estate, on the ground that the en-
joyment of the estate is burdened because the cost of taxes and
14. Id. at -, 49 N.E. at 526.
15. See, e.g., Ball v. Curtis, 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571 (1982); Baker v. Weedon, 262
So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1972).
16. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 179 (1936). The RESTATEMENT provides:
When a future interest has been limited to a person not yet in existence or to a
person lacking capacity and the persons not lacking capacity and having the rest of
the ownership of the thing cooperate to procure a sale of such ownership and a
reinvestment of the proceeds derived from such sale, and show that such sale will
be beneficial to such person who either is not yet in existence or lacks capacity,
then such future interest is subject to a judicial direction that such sale and rein-
vestment occur.
17. Elmore v. Galligher, 205 Ala. 230, 87 So. 349 (1921); Ethridge v. Pitts, 152 Ga. 1,
108 S.E. 543 (1921); Coquillard v. Coquillard, 62 Ind. App. 489, 113 N.E. 481 (1916); John-
ston v. Johnston, 276 S.W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Ruggles v. Tyson, 104 Wis. 500, 79
N.W. 766, modified, 81 N.W. 367 (1899).
18. Cauffiel v. Cauffiel, 39 Del. Ch. 190, 161 A.2d 432 (1960); Dunn v. Sanders, 243 Ga.
684, 256 S.E.2d 366 (1979); Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235, 14 N.W.2d 360 (1944);
Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1972); Lambdin v. Lambdin, 209 Miss. 672, 48 So.
2d 341 (1950).
19. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.22 (West 1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 528.010
(Vernon 1953); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 1602-1615 (McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 41-11 to 11.1 (1976); VA. CODE § 8.01-68 (1977).
20. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 528.010 (Vernon 1953).
21. 171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898).
UALR LAW JOURNAL
maintenance exceeds the profits from the land. Minnesota requires
the person seeking a judicial sale to show that the sale is necessary
or at least beneficial to the person who possesses a present estate and
that no substantial injury will be done to the interests of potential
remaindermen or the holders of other future interests.22 In contrast,
the New York statute does not require any showing that the sale will
be beneficial to the parties or that it will not harm the interests of the
holders of future interests.23
The Doctrine of Virtual Representation
In addition to the power of a court of equity to order a judicial
sale of property, the power of the court to bind persons not before
the court was another issue in Ball v. Curtis.24 The principle that a
court may bind persons not before the court if otherwise properly
represented is known as the doctrine of virtual representation.25
This doctrine is an exception to the general rule of equity that all
persons having an interest in the subject matter of a suit should be
made parties to the suit.26 Simply stated, the doctrine is that persons
not in being, unknown persons or persons too numerous to be
joined may be represented in a judicial proceeding by some other
person who is a party to the suit and who will adequately protect the
interests of those parties not before the court.27
The doctrine of virtual representation has been traced back as
far as 170128 and the English case of City of London v. Richmond.29
In City of London v. Richmond the number of shareholders who had
an interest in the suit made it impractical to bring them all before
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.22 (West 1947).
23. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 1602-1615 (McKinney 1979). Section 1602
provides:
When the ownership of real property is divided into one or more possessory inter-
ests and one or more future interests, the owner of any interest in such real prop-
erty or in the proceeds to be derived therefrom on a directed sale thereof, except
the owner of a possessory estate in fee simple absolute therein, may apply to the
court designated in section 1603 for an order directing that said real property, or a
part thereof, be mortgaged, leased or sold. If any such owner is an infant or other-
wise under disability, the application can be made on behalf of such person, by the
person duly authorized by law to care for his property interests.
24. 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571 (1982).
25. Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931); Hale v. Hale, 146 Iil. 227, 33
N.E. 858 (1893).
26. Blocker, 103 Fla. at 290, 137 So. at 252.
27. Id.
28. Annot., 1913C ANNOT. CASES 654, 655.
29. 2 Vern. 421, 23 Eng. Rep. 870 (1701).
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the court, and the court allowed one shareholder to represent the
interests of all the others.30 The doctrine of virtual representation
was first applied to cases in which future interests in property were
held by persons not in being in Hopkins v. Hopkins.3 1 The court in
Hopkins held that it was sufficient to bring the person with the first
vested estate and certain trustees of the property before the court,
and, absent fraud or collusion, all those who later came into exist-
ence would be bound by the decision.32 The most widely cited 33 of
the early cases is Gffard v. Hort, the case which established the
general rule of the doctrine of virtual representation:
[C]ourts of equity have determined, on grounds of high expedi-
ency, that it is sufficient to bring before the court the first tenant
in tail in being, and if there be no tenant in tail in being, the first
person entitled to the inheritance, and if no such person, then the
tenant for life . . . . [W]here all the parties are brought before
the court that can be brought before it, and the court acts on the
property according to the rights that appear, without fraud, its
decision must of necessity be final and conclusive. 35
Early American cases recited the English rule that allowed the
rights of persons not in esse at the time of the suit to be represented
by one of the parties before the court.3 6 Bofil v. Fisher37 is particu-
larly significant because the tenant for life was allowed to represent
those unborn persons who might succeed the life tenant in tail.38
However, as the doctrine of virtual representation has developed in
the United States it has taken different forms. 39 While some states
have passed statutes which permit the appointment of a guardian ad
30. Id. at 422, 23 Eng. Rep. at 871.
31. 1 Atk. 581, 26 Eng. Rep. 365 (1738).
32. Id. at 590, 26 Eng. Rep. at 371.
33. Those cases which cite Giffard as authority include: Garside v. Garside, 80 Cal.
App. 2d 318, 181 P.2d 665 (1947); Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659, cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 670 (1942); Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N.E. 858 (1893); Evangel Baptist
Church v. Chambers, 96 N.J. Super. 367, 233 A.2d 82 (1967); Dunham v. Doremus, 55 N.J.
Eq. 511, 37 A. 62 (1897); Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. 1, 55 Am. Dec. 627 (S.C. 1850); Ridley
v. Halliday, 106 Tenn. 607, 61 S.W. 1025 (1901); Faulkner v. Davis, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 651,
98 Am. Dec. 698 (1868); Baylor's Lessee v. Dejarnette, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 152 (1856).
34. 1 Sch. & Lef. 386 (1804).
35. Id. at 408.
36. See, e.g., Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. 1, 55 Am. Dec. 627 (S.C. 1850); Cheesman v.
Thorne, I Edw. Ch. 629 (N.Y. Ch. 1833).
37. 3 Rich. Eq. 1, 55 Am. Dec. 627 (S.C. 1850).
38. Id. at -, 55 Am. Dec. at 632.
39. See R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 296 (1981); L. SIMES AND A.
SMITH, supra note 5, at §§ 1941-1946.
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litem to protect the interests of persons not in esse, ° other states
have developed the doctrine by case law. American decisions now
recognize six different situations which provide adequate represen-
tation of unborn persons in proceedings before courts of equity:41
1. The representative is a member of the class having a future
interest in property and the class is subject to being opened.42
2. The representative has the first vested estate in remainder
and the unborn person will only acquire an estate if the prior
estate is defeated.43
3. The estate of the representative is subject to a condition pre-
cedent and the person not in being may take instead of the
representative. 4
4. The representative is the life tenant and the representative's
unborn children have contingent interests. 4
40. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 508.18 (West 1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 528.020
(Vernon 1953); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.41 (1968); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1608
(McKinney 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-14 (1976); VA. CODE § 8.01-94 (1977). The Mis-
souri statute is typical of such statutes. It reads in part:
2. In any case provided in this chapter to be brought if the petition shall allege or
it shall appear to the court at any time pending the suit that an interest or estate in
the land constituting the subject matter of the suit might vest in a person or persons
not in being and who may not be so representable by persons in being of the same
class or related estate, then the court shall appoint some disinterested attorney,
member of its bar, to represent and protect as a friend of the court the interests of
such possible persons, and all such shall be bound by the result of the suit.
41. R. POWELL, supra note 39, at § 296; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 182-186.
42. See Groves v. Burton, 125 Ind. App. 302, 123 N.E.2d 204 (1954) (after-born son was
in the same class as the living children and bound by the judgment); Kent v. Church of St.
Michael, 136 N.Y. 10, 32 N.E. 704, (1892) (vested remainder in living grandchildren subject
to opening the class of remaindermen); Exparte Dodd, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 101 (1867) (to D
for life and at his death in fee simple to his child or children; living children as
representatives).
43. See Dunham v. Doremus, 55 N.J. Eq. 511, 37 A. 62 (1897) (testator to daughter with
limitation over by way of executory devise or contingent remainder to her children if she
had any in the future); McDavid v. McDavid, 187 S.C. 127, 197 S.E. 204 (1938) (to father for
life, contingent remainder to X in case father died without living issue); L. SIMES AND A.
SMITH, supra note 5, at § 1813; J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS § 146 (10th ed. 1892).
44. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dower, 222 Iowa 1377, 271 N.W. 193 (1937) (to
husband and wife for their lives and then to children of the husband; if husband dies with-
out issue, then to the legal heirs of the grantor. The children in being represented all other
potential remaindermen); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 Ky. 380, 227 S.W.2d
410 (1950) (A to wife for life, then to daughter for life, with remainder to her heirs; in event
daughter dies without heirs, to A's brother if living, then to brother's heirs).
45. Montgomery v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 83 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1936) (to
daughter for life with remainder to her children; unborn represented by the daughter); El-
more v. Galligher, 205 Ala. 230, 87 So. 349 (1921) (to daughters for life, and to their chil-
dren, if any, at their death); Baker v. Baker, 284 Ill. 537, 120 N.E. 525 (1918) (testator to
daughter and her bodily heirs); Sparks v. Clay, 185 Mo. 393, 84 S.W. 40 (1904) (to A for life
remainder to the heirs of A's body; heirs of the body were properly represented by A);
1983] CONTINGENT REMAINDERS 363
5. The representative holds a power of appointment, and the
unborn person is one who may be appointed by the
representative.46
6. The representative and the unborn person have an interest in
something other than land, and one of the above five rela-
tionships exists.4 7
Professor Richard Powell adds two other factors which the
courts in the United States have examined to determine whether the
interests of unborn persons are adequately represented. 8 These are
the absence of hostility of interests between the representative and
the person whose interests are represented and the identity of their
claims.4 9 Section 185 of the Restatement of the Law of Property also
recognizes the possibility that the interests of the representative and
the person who is represented might be hostile.50 However, it pro-
vides that there must be an affirmative showing of hostility of inter-
ests before the representation will be considered inadequate. I In its
varied forms the doctrine of virtual representation has been reaf-
Carraway v. Lassiter, 139 N.C. 145, 51 S.E. 968 (1905) (Mrs. C. represented the contingent
remainder in favor of her unborn children); Schneider v. Wolf, 120 Ohio St. 524, 166 N.E.
679 (1929) (to son for life with remainder to begotten sons who survive him, if none then
remainder to other sons of the testator); Ridley v. Halliday, 106 Tenn. 607, 61 S.W. 1025
(1901) (interests of the unborn children and grandchildren of the testator's daughter were
adequately represented by the daughter); Geary v. Butts, 84 W. Va. 348, 99 S.E. 492 (1919)
(in addition to representation by the life tenant, the unborn were also represented by a
trustee and the living remaindermen); See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 184(d) (1936);
Roberts, Virtual Representation In Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 580, 585
(1936); J. STORY, supra note 43, at § 145.
46. Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 406, 9 A.2d 311 (1939) (A to such
persons as B might appoint by her will); L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, supra note 5, at § 1812;
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 184(dd) and Comment ff (1936).
47. Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659, cert. denied 317 U.S. 670 (1942)
(the class of unborn contingent remaindermen to a trust was represented by the children of
the living beneficiaries of the trust); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 184(e) (1936).
48. R. POWELL, supra note 39, at 580-81. The following cases dealt with the doctrine of
virtual representation and also considered Professor Powell's additional factors of identity of
claim or hostility of interests between the representative and the person who was repre-
sented: United States v. 122,000 Acres of Land, 57 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Tex. 1944) (identity
of claim); Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N.E. 62 (1921) (hostility of interests); Groves
v. Burton, 125 Ind. App. 302, 123 N.E.2d 204, reh'g denied, 125 Ind. App. 317, 123 N.E.2d
705 (1954) (hostility of interests); Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 Ky. 380, 227
S.W.2d 410 (1950) (hostility of interests); Lowe v. Taylor, 222 Ky. 846, 2 S.W.2d 1042 (1928)
(hostility of interests); Downey v. Seib, 185 N.Y. 427, 78 N.E. 66, (1906) (hostility of inter-
ests); Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N.C. 445, 152 S.E. 398 (1930) (hostility of interests); Rodgers v.
Unborn Child or Children of Rodgers, 204 Tenn. 96, 315 S.W.2d 521 (1958) (hostility of
interests); Brown v. Wood, 239 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (hostility of interests).
49. R. POWELL, supra note 39, at 580-81.
50. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 185 and comments b-c (1936).
51. Id.
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firmed in the decisions of many states. 2
The Arkansas Case Law
Arkansas case law has not clearly distinguished the doctrine of
virtual representation and the power of a court of equity to order the
sale of land affected by contingent future interests.53 The first Ar-
kansas case to hold that a court of equity had the power to order a
sale for reinvestment of property in which persons held future inter-
ests was Bedford v. Bedford.54 Bedford dealt with the court's power
to order a sale when the minor daughter of the petitioner had a con-
tingent interest in the property, and the court held that it could or-
der a sale relying on Gavin v. Curtin." The Arkansas court also held
that the living contingent remaindermen could represent those who
were not in being.56
The Bedford holding that a court of equity has the power to
order a sale for reinvestment has been followed in four cases prior to
Ball v. Curtis." In each of these cases there was a person in being
who belonged to the class of potential remaindermen, but the court
did not mention the doctrine of virtual representation58 even though
52. See, e.g., Young v. Rice, 280 Ala. 581, 196 So. 2d 698 (1967); Garside v. Garside, 80
Cal. App. 2d 318, 181 P.2d 665 (1947); In re Campbell's Estate, 46 Hawaii 475, 382 P.2d 920
(1963); Gunnell v. Palmer, 370 Ill. 206, 18 N.E.2d 202 (1938); Longworth v. Duff, 297 Ill.
479, 130 N.E. 690 (1921); Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 33 N.E. 858 (1893); Coquillard v. Co-
quillard, 62 Ind. App. 489, 113 N.E. 481 (1916); Robinson v. Barrett, 142 Kan. 68, 45 P.2d
587 (1935); Foreman v. Taylor, 239 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1951); Smith v. Fowler, 301 Ky. 96, 190
S.W.2d 1015 (1945); Middleton v. Graves, 229 Ky. 640, 17 S.W.2d 741 (1929); Mathews v.
Lightner, 85 Minn. 333, 88 N.W. 992, 89 Am. St. Rep. 558 (1902); Copeland v. West, 202
Miss. 106, 30 So. 2d 610 (1947); Brown v. Bibb, 201 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1947); Reinders v.
Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482, 30 Am. Rep. 802 (1878); Evangel Baptist Church v. Chambers, 96
N.J. Super. 367, 233 A.2d 82 (1967); Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N.Y. 210, 72 Am. Dec. 455 (1858);
Yarborough v. Moore, 151 N.C. 116, 65 S.E. 763 (1909); Springs v. Scott, 132 N.C. 548, 44
S.E. 116 (1903); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Barlow, 235 S.C. 488, 112 S.E.2d 396 (1960); Bernard
v. Bernard, 79 S.C. 364, 60 S.E. 700, (1908); Rutledge v. Fishburne, 66 S.C. 155, 44 S.E. 564,
(1903); Rodgers v. Unborn Child or Children of Rodgers, 204 Tenn. 96, 315 S.W.2d 521
(1958); Bransford Realty Co. v. Andrews, 128 Tenn. 725, 164 S.W. 1175 (1914); Bradley v.
Henry, 239 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Faulkner v. Davis, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 651, 98
Am. Dec. 698 (1868); Baylor's Lessee v. Dejamette, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 152 (1856); Cotton v.
Bank of Cal., 145 Wash. 503, 261 P. 104 (1927).
53. See, e.g., Bedford v. Bedford, 105 Ark. 587, 152 S.W. 129 (1912).
54. Id.
55. 171 Ill. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898).
56. 105 Ark. at 591, 152 S.W. at 131.
57. Walker v. Blaney, 225 Ark. 918, 286 S.W.2d 479 (1956); Wigal v. Hensley, 214 Ark.
409, 216 S.W.2d 792 (1949); Wing v. Wing, 212 Ark. 960, 208 S.W.2d 776 (1948); Hardy v.
Hilton, 211 Ark. 991, 204 S.W.2d 163 (1947).
58. See, e.g., Wing v. Wing, 212 Ark. 960, 208 S.W.2d 776 (1948).
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the doctrine had been recognized in Arkansas. 9
One other case deserves mention in relation to the discussion of
Arkansas law. In Causey v. Wolfe6 ° the Arkansas Supreme Court
recognized that a life tenant could represent contingent remainder-
men who were not in being in a suit to enjoin other claimants to the
estate from committing waste. As authority, the court cited J Story,
Equity Pleadings61 and Ridley v. Halliday,62 both of which are recog-
nized as authority for the doctrine of virtual representation. 63 Cau-
sey appears to give the same rule as Ball v. Curtis, but the case has
not been cited as authority for that proposition.64 However, it
should be noted that Causey v. Wolfe has been cited in two promi-
nent sources for the proposition that a life tenant may represent un-
born contingent remaindermen.65
Ball v. Curtis
In Ball v. Curtis66 Justice George Rose Smith began by citing
precedent that, upon a proper showing, a court of equity could order
a sale for reinvestment of land held by a life tenant with contingent
remainders that will not vest until the death of the life tenant.67 The
court noted that in all the earlier cases there was a member of the
59. See Lightle v. Kirby, 194 Ark. 535, 108 S.W.2d 896 (1937). Note, however, that in
Wing v. Wing, 212 Ark. 960, 208 S.W.2d 776 (1948), and Wigal v. Hensley, 214 Ark. 409,
216 S.W.2d 792 (1949), the court specifically mentioned that the minor contingent remain-
dermen were represented by guardians ad litem. Presumably, the court appointed the
guardians pursuant to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1803 (1962) which provides that a guardian
may appear at partition proceedings to protect the interests of infants, and the court may
appoint a guardian if one does not appear on behalf of the infant.
60. 135 Ark. 9, 204 S.W. 977 (1918).
61. J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS (10th ed. 1892).
62. 106 Tenn. 607, 61 S.W. 1025 (1901).
63. 135 Ark. 9, 19, 204 S.W. 977, 980. See supra note 45.
64. The following cases cited Causey: Hobbs v. Lenon, 191 Ark. 509, 519, 87 S.W.2d 6,
11 (1935) (a person acquiring property pendente lite is bound by the judgment whether a
party to the litigation or not); Graves v. Simms Oil Co., 189 Ark. 910, 913, 75 S.W.2d 809,
811 (1934) (cites Causey for the rule that an oral gift of land is not enforceable unless there is
actual possession delivered followed by the making of valuable improvements); Lumpkin v.
Askins, 187 Ark. 1009, 1013, 63 S.W.2d 984, 986 (1933) (cites Causey for the same rule as
Graves v. Simms Oil Co.); Murphy v. Graves, 170 Ark. 180, 184, 279 S.W. 359, 361 (1926)
(cites Causey for the same rule as Graves v. Simms Oil Co.); Russell v. Pagan, 167 Ark. 143,
150, 267 S.W. 573, 575 (1925) (cites Causey for the rule that a life tenant may dispose of
timber for the purpose of cultivating the land he holds as life tenant).
65. L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, supra note 5, at § 1824; Annot., 120 A.L.R. 876, 885 (1939).
66. 276 Ark. 498, 627 S.W.2d 571 (1982).
67. Id. at 498, 637 S.W.2d at 572. The court based the statement on the cases of Walker
v. Blaney, 225 Ark. 918, 286 S.W.2d 479 (1956); Wing v. Wing, 212 Ark. 960, 208 S.W.2d
776 (1948); Hardy v. Hilton, 211 Ark. 991, 204 S.W.2d 163 (1947) and Bedford v. Bedford,
105 Ark. 587, 152 S.W. 129 (1912).
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class of potential remaindermen in being at the time the action was
brought. The living members of the class could be said to represent
the interests of the remaindermen not in being.68 In Ball, however,
there was no contingent remaindermen in existence who could rep-
resent the potential bodily heirs of Sheila Ball Curtis. The court
then defined the issue to be whether a court of equity could order a
sale for reinvestment in the absence of a living member of the po-
tential class of contingent remaindermen.69 The court held that a
court does have the power to order a sale for reinvestment even
though no member of the class of potential remaindermen was in
being at the time of the proceeding. 70 The court then held, without
further discussion, that a life tenant is a proper representative of her
unborn descendants when she does not have any bodily heirs in
being.71
In Ball v. Curtis the Arkansas Supreme Court has taken a step
toward modernizing the law of future interests in Arkansas by
bringing it into agreement with the American Law Institute,72 prom-
inent treatises 73 and the law of many other jurisdictions. 74 Perhaps
the most significant aspect of the decision is that the case should
have the effect of creating greater marketability of title to lands en-
cumbered with contingent future interests. The trend in the United
States has been toward greater marketability of land, 75 and legal
scholars have long recognized the harmful consequences to individ-
ual owners and society in general when the alienation of contingent
future interests is restricted.76
68. 276 Ark. at 498, 637 S.W.2d at 572.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 499, 637 S.W.2d at 572. In support of the holding the opinion cited the RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 179 (1936), R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 292
and Comment, Alienability of Contingent Remainders, 2 ARK. L. REV. 87 (1948).
71. 276 Ark. at 499, 637 S.W.2d at 572. The court cited the RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 184(d) (1936) in support of the statement that a life tenant is a proper representative
of unborn bodily heirs.
72. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 184(d) (1936).
73. R. POWELL, supra note 39; J. STORY, supra note 43.
74. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 45.
75. L. SIMES AND A. SMITH, supra note 5, at § 1941.
76. See Roberts, Virtual Representation In Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL. L.
REV. 580 (1936); Schnebly, Power of Life Tenant or Remainderman to Extinguish Other Inter-
ests by Judicial Process, 42 HARV. L. REV. 30 (1928). Schnebly, at page 55, says the
following:
Where the remainder is contingent, or vested in some of a class subject to opening
to admit later-born members, it is obvious that alienation is materially restricted, if
not practically impossible. The injurious consequences in such a case may be far
reaching. The life tenant fails to realize the maximum possible benefit from his
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CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
Although the court has taken a step toward modernizing the
law of future interests in Arkansas, the court's opinion is inadequate
for several reasons. First, the court states that Sheila Ball Curtis, as
the life tenant, is a proper representative of the unborn contingent
remaindermen, but the court does not state the standard to be ap-
plied in determining when the life tenant is a proper representative.
The court relied on section 184(d) of the Restatement of the Law of
Property in holding that the life tenant was a proper representative,
and a comment 77 to that section recognizes that the protection of the
interests of persons not in esse is "less substantial" when represented
by the life tenant than in the other situations approved by the Re-
statement. The comment also notes, however, that the diminished
protection accorded by the life tenant is normally offset since the life
tenant, who also has an interest in the estate, will usually defend the
interests of his unborn issue adequately.7 8 The Arkansas Supreme
Court may have been aware of the questions and potential problems
raised by this comment to section 184 in relation to the adequacy of
the life tenant's representation, but the opinion does not indicate
this. Although the possibility that the interests of the representative
and remaindermen might be hostile has proven to be a significant
factor in the decisions of other states, 79 the court does not even rec-
ognize this factor.
Another factor which the court should have mentioned was that
the proceeds of the sale for reinvestment were to go into a trust to
protect the interests of the potential remaindermen.8 ° The inclusion
of this fact in the opinion would have been evidence that the inter-
ests of the unborn remaindermen were properly protected. The
court also could have relied upon authority in other jurisdictions
and clearly stated the standard to be applied in order to avoid un-
certainty on this point.
In addition, the court failed to analyze the applicable Arkansas
law completely. The court does not mention the case of Causey v.
interest; there is an injury to society at large by reason of the reduction in the
quantity of marketable land; the particular locality may lose an increase in taxable
values; and if the income yielded by the land is not sufficient to pay the taxes and
assessments, it is even possible that the interests of all persons, remaindermen as
well as life tenant, may be destroyed.
77. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 184 Comment f (1936).
78. Id.
79. Supra note 49.
80. Abstract and Brief of Appellants at 5, Ball v. Curtis, 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571
(1982).
1983]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Wolfe81 which, as previously noted, 82 recognized that a life tenant
could represent contingent remaindermen who were not in being at
the time of the suit. The failure to discuss Causey is especially nota-
ble since the case is cited by at least two prominent legal sources
83
for the proposition that a life tenant may represent the unborn con-
tingent remaindermen having an interest in the estate. Finally, the
court failed to reconcile the holding in Ball v. Curtis with other Ar-
kansas cases which hold that the wishes of the testator should be
given effect whenever possible. 84 The failure to discuss the intention
of the testator is also puzzling since the issue was raised by the
appellants.85
In conclusion, Ball v. Curtis is an important step toward the
modernization of the future interest law in Arkansas. The decision
may also have the effect of creating greater marketability of title in
land limited by contingent future interests. However, the opinion
may be too narrow, and subsequent cases may be necessary to fully
develop the rule that a life tenant is the proper representative of
unborn issue who have contingent future interests.
William 4. Waddell, Jr.
81. 135 Ark. 9, 204 S.W. 977 (1918).
82. See supra text accompanying note 60.
83. Supra note 65.
84. See Bakos v. Kryder, 260 Ark. 621, 624, 543 S.W.2d 216, 218 (1976); Carroll v.
Robinson, 248 Ark. 904, 906, 454 S.W.2d 329, 330 (1970); Graves v. Bean, 200 Ark. 863, 865,
141 S.W.2d 50, 52 (1940). See also Fetters, The Entailed Estate. Fermentfor Reform in
Arkansas, 19 ARK. L. REV. 275, 277 (1966). Fetters acknowledges the rule that the intention
of the testator should prevail whenever possible, but he also notes that the rule is difficult to
apply.
85. Abstract and Brief of Appellants at 16, Ball v. Curtis, 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571
(1982). The Arkansas Supreme Court also did not address ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-405.1
(1971) which provides for the dissolution of estates tail. The Arkansas fee tail statute (ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 50-405 (1971)) applies to devises by will; but the language of § 50-405.1 is
ambiguous and it is not clear whether a fee tail created by a devise may be dissolved under
the statute. This ambiguity could have been clarified here but must now await consideration
in the future.
[Vol. 6:357368
